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TAXATION OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES OBTAINED IN A
PERSONAL INJURY CLAIM
by Douglas A. Kahn

Douglas A. Kahn is the Paul G .. Kauper Profes..
sor1 University of Michigan Law School.
The authcT explains that in re~ent court
opinions and commentaries concerning whether

punitive damages are taxable, considerable

weight has been given to a negative Inference that
appears to lurk in a 1989 amendment to the

relevant code provision, section 104(a)(2). To the
contrary, he atglJ.es, the legislative history of that
amendment and the form that the bill had when
it was reported out of the Conference Committee
establish be}'ond doubt that no such inference is
warranted.

Since the adoption in 1919 of the Revenue Act of
1918, the statutory tax law has expressly excluded from
gross income damages received on account of a personal injury or sickness. This statutory provision currently is set forth at section 104{a){2) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986. The exclusion from income does
not apply to the extent that the payment constitutes a
reimbursement for medical expenses for which the taxpayer previously had been allowed a tax deduction.
Prior to 1975, the IRS commissioner asserted that the
statutory exclusion for damages received on account
of a personal injury does not prevent the taxation of
punitive damages even when received as part of an
award or a settlement of a claim for personal injury.
While the commissioner departed from that view in the
period between 1975 and 1984, she returned to her
original position in 1984.1 The Tax Court and the Sixth
Circuit, however, maintain that all damages received
in connection with a personal injury claim, i~cluding
punitive damages, are excluded from gross income by
section 104(a)(2).2 Three of the four circuit courts of

'Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975--1C.B.47, revoked by Rev. Rul. 84-108,
1~84-2

C.B. 32.

2Miller v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 330 (1989) (reviewed by the
coutt), rev'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th

Cir. 1990); Horton 'D. Commissioner, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir.
1994) (divided decision), affg 100 T.C. 93 (1993) (reviewed by
the court}.
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appeals (the Fourth, Ninth, and Federal Circuits)3 that
have passed on this issue at the date of this writing have
held that punitive damages are included in gross income;
but trial courts have divided on this issue. The Sixth
Circuit has excluded punitive damages from income, and
appeals are pending in two other circuit courts of appeals.
The question of whether punitive damages should
be excluded from income will continue to be litigated
in the immediate future. The issue has been fueled by
the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in United States v.
Burke,4 and by the amendment to section 104(a) that
was adopted in 1989. In the soon to be published article, "Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not To Tax?" the author has
examined the current tax treatment of both punitive
and compensatory damages, has criticized the standards adopted by the Supreme Court in Burke for determining whether damages are excludable, and has made
suggestionf:: as to the proper standards for applying the
statutory exclusion from income. This article addresses
a more modest topic - namely, the proper construction
of the last sentence of section 104(a).

I

The question of whether punitive
damages should be excluded from
Income will continue to be litigated In
the Immediate future.

In 1989, Congress amended section 104(a} by adding
the last sentence of that provision.5 The last sentence
reads:
Paragraph (2) [i.e., section 104(a)(2)] shall not
apply to any punitive damages in connection
with a case not involving physical injury or
physical sickness.
Subject to transitional rules, punitive damages (or
settlements in lieu thereof) that are received after July
10, 1989, in cases of nonphysical injuries, will be tax3
Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1990); Hawkins
United States, __ F.3d _ _ (9th Cir. 1994) (divided
decision); Reese v. Commissioner,_ F.3d_ (Fed. Cir.1994).
Contra, Horton v. Commissioner, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir. 1994)

D.

(divided decision).
'504 U.S. - - . J 112 S.Ct. 1827 (1992).
5Pub. Law 101-239, section 7641, 103 Stat. 2379 (1989).
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able. Thus, punitive damages received in cases involving discriminatory practices or defamation or other
dignitary torts will be taxable. That will eliminate
much of the current controversy, but several important
issues remain.
First, what will be the tax treatment of punitive
damages that are received in a case in which there has
been a physical injury? The 1989 amendment, which
precludes the application of section 104(a)(2) when
there is not a physical injury, creates a negative inference that section 104(a)(2) does apply to punitive
damages when there is a physical injury. However, care
should be taken as to whether a negative inference is
warranted. As will be shown below, an examination of
the legislative history of the 1989 amendment Jearly
establishes that Congress had no intention of passing
on the proper treatment of punitive damages in any
circumstance other than when there was no physical
injury.
Second, does the adoption of the 1989 amendment
demonstrate that Congress believed that the pre-1989
law excluded punitive damages from income when
received pursuant to a claim for a personal injury?
Even if the amendment does indicate that Congress
held that belief, what weight should the courts accord
to it?
Let us first consider the effect of the amendment on
post-1989 punitive damages obtained in a case involving a physical injury. While no case has yet arisen in
which punitive damages for a physical injury were
received after July 10, 1989, several courts, including
the Supreme Court, have assumed that the negative
inference of the amendment's language is valid. For
exalilple, in footnote 6 of the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Burke,6 the Court stated:
Congress' 1989 amendment to section 104(a)(2)
provides further support for the notion that "personal injuries" includes physical as well as nonphysical injuries. Congress rejected a bill that
would. have limited the section 104(a)(2) exclusion to cases involving "physical injury or
physical sickness." See H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, pp.
1354-1355 (describing proposed section 11641 of
H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)). At the
same time, Conpess amended section 104(a) to allow
the exclusion of punitive damages only in cases involving "physical injury or physical sickness." [Emphasis added.] .... The adoption of this limited
amendment addressing only punitive damages
shows that Congress assumed that other damages
(i.e., compensatory) would be excluded in cases
of both physical and nonphysical injury.
The Supreme Court construed the amendment as
having both an inclusionary and an exclusionary direction. By stating the rule as allowing an exclusion for
punitive damages only when there was ci :ohysical injury, the Court adopted the view that the amendment
allows an exclusion for a physical injury and denies an
exclusion for a nonphysical injury. In fact, the language

'Burke, note 4 supra.
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of the amendment addresses only the circumstances in
which there is no physical injury and makes no express
statement concerning the treatment of damages when
a physical injury is present. The Court did not analyze
the amendment; it simply assumed that the denial of
an exclusion for nonphysical injuries amounted to allowing one for physical injuries. The statement was
made by the Court in the middle of a lengthy footnote
that dealt with the question of whether compensatory
damages for nonphysical injuries are excluded from
income by section 104(a)(2). The Court's comment concerning the amendment's authorization of an exclusion
of punitive damages when there was a physical injury
is dictum and does not appear to be the product of any
serious thought, much less a consideration of the legislative history. }lor the point that the Court made in that
footnote ~i.e., that the amendment's precluding an exclusion when the injury is nonphysical supposedly
shows that section 104(a)(2) otherwise applies to compensatory damages for nonphysical injuries), it makes
no difference whether the amendment permits an exclusion for punitive damages when a physical injury
is present. There was no reason for the Court to focus
on the question of the applicability of the amendment
to physical injury claims, and it does not appear to have
done so. The Court's remarks concerning the application of the amendment to physical injury cases appear
to be the product of a casual reading of the statute and
are not worthy of any weight.

Several courts have referred to the
Supreme Court's statement In Burke
as support for the view that the 1989
amendment a/lows for the exclusion of
punitive damages In cases Involving
physics/Injuries.
Nevertheless, several courts have referred to the
Supreme Court's statement in Burke as support for the
view that the 1989 amendment allows for the exclusion
of punitive damages in cases involving physical injuries. For example, the Supreme Court's comment on
the amendment was cited with approval by the Sixth
Circuit in its affirmance of the Tax Court's decision that
punitive damages are excluded from income by section
104(a}(2).:r In addition, at least two commentators concluded that the amendment implicitly permits the exclusion of punitive damages received after 1989 in a
case involving physical injuries~8 Let us now consider
whether those conclusions are warranted.

7Horton v. Commissioner, __ F.3d __ (6th Cir. 1994)
(divided decision). The Supreme Court's statement also was
quoted by Judge Trott in his dissenting opinion in Hilwldns v.
United States,_ R3d _(9th Cir. 1994) (divided decision).
1
David Jaeger, "Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards: The
Continuing Controversy,n Tax Notes, Oct. S, 1992. p. 109; Arthur W. Andrews, "The Taxation of Title Vll Victims After the
Civil Rights Act of 1991," 46 Tax Lawyer 755, 766 (1993).
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The House bill (H.R. 3299) that ultimately became the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 contained a
proposed amendment to section 104(a)(2). Section 11641
of that bill would have amended section 104(a)(2) to permit the exclusion of personal injwy damages only in a
case involving physical injwy or physical sickness. The
bill, with that provision intact, was passed by the House
on October 5, 1989. The committee Report on that bill
reflects that the principal focus of the House in adopting
section 11641 was to preclude the exclusion of damages
obtained in cases involving employment discrimination
and defamation. 9
The Senate's bill, however, made no mention of section 104 or the treatment of damages. The Conference
Committee did not adopt the restriction th::.: had
passed the House, but the Committee did adopt an
amendment to section 104(a) that added the last sentence to that provision. The amendment is set forth in
section 7641 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1989.10 That amendment barred the application of
section 104(a)(2) to exclude from income punitive
damages received in a case involving nonphysical injuries. If the legislative history is ignored, there are
several possible inferences that might be drawn as to
the purpose of including that provision in the final act.
An examination of the legislative history removes any
doubt as to the purpose of that provision.
The Conference Committee reported the bill on
November 21, 1989.11 Two months earlier, on September 13, 1989, the Tax Court promulgated its reviewed
decision in Miller v. Commissioner12 in which a majority
of that court held that punitive damages can be excluded under section 104(a)(2). The Fourth Circuit's
reversal of the Tax Court's decision did not take place
until almost one year later, on September 21, 1990.
Consequently, at the time that the Conference Committee (and then the whole Congress) acted, the principal
case on the question of the excludability of punitive
damages was a recent Tax Court decision, in which
only two judges dissented, holding that they are excluded.
The Senate refused to adopt the limitation on section
104(a)(2) that the House had passed. The Senate was
not willing to make taxable all damages obtained for
nonphysical injuries. At the Conference Corr.mittee, a
compromise was reached. The Senate agreed to prevent
the application of section 104(a)(2) to punitive damages
received in a case involving only nonphysical injuries.
The Senate thereby provided the supporters of the
House bill with the assurance that there would be no
exclusion of punitive damages in such cases. The Conference Committee did not necessarily believe that
punitive damages would be excluded in the absence of

the amendment. They could well have intended no
more than to assure that punitive damages will not be
excluded when there was no physical injury, regardless
of how the courts might otherwise resolve the question
of the excludability of punitive damages under the
pre-1989 version of section 104. Even if the Conference
Committee believed that punitive damages would be
excludable without the amendment, that would be because of the presence of a reviewed Tax Court decision
to that effect. The committee could not know that that
decision would be reversed on appeal
There is no indication that the committee, or Congress as a whole, desired that punitive damages be
excluded when there was a physical injury. To the contrary, the history of the forms that the bill took as it
passed through the legislative process makes it abundantly clear that Congress deliberately chose not to
pass on that issue and instead chose to leave that question to be resolved by the courts.
The bill (H.R. 3299) that the Conference Committee
I't'ported on November 21, 1989, contains inked changes
in the printed copy of the bill. Section 7641 of that bill
conta:ns the amendment to section 104(a). Four words of
the printed copy of section 7641 were deleted in ink, and
one word was added in ink.13 The altered version is the
one that was adopted and is now part of section 104(a).
The unaltered copy of section 7641 read as follows:
Sec. 7641. Limitation on Section 104 Exclusion.
(a) General Rule. - Section 104(a) (relating to
compensation for injuries or sickness) is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new
sentence: "Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any
punitive damages unless such damages are in
connection with a case involving physical injury
or physical sickness."
The language of the bill was altered in ink by drawing
a line with a deletion symbol through the words "unless such damages are" and by inserting in ink the
word "not" between the words "case" and "involving."
As altered, the amendment read, "Paragraph (2) shall
not apply to any punitive damages in connection with
a case not involving physical injury or physical sickness." As reported by the committee, the amendment
appeared something like this:

9
H.R. Rep. No. 101-247, 101stCong., lstSess., pp.1354-1355
(Sept. 20, 1989).
10
Pub. Law 101-239, section 7641, 103 Stat. 2379 (1989).
"Revenue Prot1isions of Conference Agreement on HR 3299,
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, released by Senate
Finance Committee on November 21, 1989.
12
Mil/er, note 2 supra. The taxpayer in Miller had received
both compensatory and punitive damages in the settlement
of a d~famation claim.

1
lThe Conference Committee's version of the amendment
is set forth in DTR No. 224, Special Supplement, p. S-81
(November 22, 1989). The inked changes are marked on the
bill as reproduced therein. The Conference Committee's bill,
with those inked changes shown on the bill, also is reproduced
in a bulletin of Prentice Hall that was published at that time;
the bulletin is titled: Revenue Provisions of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989 (Title Vll), and was published as
Bulletin 47 Extra on November 28. 1989.
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"Paragraph (2) shall not apply to any punitive
damages
unless sueh damages are in connection with a
case" not involving physical injury or physical
sickness."
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The original printed version of the amendment
would have made both a positive and a negative statement. It would have provided that punitive dam11gt:.>:>
received in connection with a physical injury are excluded from income and that pun!.tive damage& that
are not connected with~ physical injury are included
in income. The handwritten alteration that was made
on the printed text changed the provision to make only
a negative statement; it provides that p1;.nitive damages
that are not connected with a physical injury are not
excluded from income by section 104.
Congress did not inadvertently fail to makP. an explicit statement th.at punitivt? damages connected with
a physical injury are exclud.!d. To the contrar}~ when
the draft contained that statement, Congress de!!berately deleted it so a:; not to take a position on that issue.
It is clear, then, that the 1989 amendment has no bearing on thE' question of the excludability of punitive
damages that iil'e connected w_!h a physical injury.

I

It Is clear that the 1989 emendment
has no bearing on the question of the
excludablllty of punitive damageN that
are connected wlth a physical injury.

A second issue is whether the adoption of the 1989
amendment implies that Congress believed that section
104(a)(2), as it existed before the amendment, excluded
punitive damages from income. As shown above, it is
by no means c.lear that Congress believed that section
104(a)(2) applied to punitive damages. Congress may
have merely wished to asi,,ue that the court'> would
not apply the exclusion when nonphysical injuries are
involved. At the time that Congress acted, the Miller
case had been decided by the Tax Court.H With cmly
two judges dissenting, the court had held. that p.,. titive
damages are excluded by section 104(a)(2). While the
Tax Court's decision was reversed a year later, Congress woulc! at least have believed that the .::ourts might
follow the Tax Court's lead and holrl that punitive
damages are excluded from income. On the other hand,
the courts might not adopt the Tax Court ·s view. Congre:;s chose to take a position on that issue only as it
relato:?s ttJ punith·e damages that are received when

there a1e no phy.;icaJ injuries. It is highly unlilcely that
Congress deliberately struck from the bill lll'Y reference
to punitive damages acquired in connection with a
.~hysicaJ injury claim because it considered that issue
settled and wished to avoid a redundancy. It is far more
likely that Congress, having more pressing matters
before it, ~hose not to deal with that issue and leave it
for the courts to resolve.
Even if, ilt 1989, Congress did believe that punitive
damages are excluded by section 104(3)(2), that belief
would have little or no significance. ln the discussion
of this issue in Hawkins, the Ninth Circuit quoted the
Sup:-eme Court's stl'ttement that "the views of a subsequent Congress fotm a hazardous basis for inferring
the intent o! an earlier one." 15 That is especially true
here, since there is every reason to doubt that Congress
held tha! opinion.
In sum, the 1989 amendment sheds no light on
whether punitive damages received pr:or to that year
are excluded from income or on whether punitive
damages received after that year in connection with a
physical injury are excluded.
One more question needs to be discussed. The last
sentence of section 104{a) refers to "physical injury or
physical sickness." If th"' victim of a dignitary tort has
a mental breakdown as a consequence of •he humiliation he suffered, could purtitive damages ..cquired because of that tort be excluded from income by section
104(a)(2) because the victim incurred a "physical sickness"? Jn such a case, the injury inflkted by the
wrongdoer would not he physical, but one of the consequences of that injury would be a physical reaction.
Given the legislative history of the 1989 amendment,
it S<!ems t.'lat Congress intended to bar the exclusion of
punitive damages when the ~crt itr.elf did not constitute
a physical intrusion to the person of the injured party.
The principal focus of the 1989 House bill was to
prevent the exclusion of damages received in discrimination and def?mation cases. The final bill was a
compromise that limited that bar to punitive damages
received in such cases. The purpose of the amendment
would be frustrated ii the exclusion were extended to
pur.1tive damages received in connection with discriminativn and defamation cases when the victim became ill as a cvnsequence of the wrongful act.

15Hawkins
14
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Miller. note 2 supra.

v. United States, __ F.3d __ (9th Cir. 1994)

(divided decision), quoting from United States v. Price, 361 U.S.
304, 313 (1961).
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